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Mobile device authentication has been a highly active research topic for over 10 years, with a vast range
of methods having been proposed and analyzed. In related areas such as secure channel protocols, remote
authentication, or desktop user authentication, strong, systematic, and increasingly formal threat models
have already been established and are used to qualitatively and quantitatively compare dierent methods.
Unfortunately, the analysis of mobile device authentication is often based on weak adversary models, suggesting
overly optimistic results on their respective security. In this article, we rst introduce a new classication
of adversaries to better analyze and compare mobile device authentication methods. We then apply this
classication to a systematic literature survey. The survey shows that security is still an afterthought and that
most proposed protocols lack a comprehensive security analysis. Our proposed classication of adversaries
provides a strong uniform adversary model that can oer a comparable and transparent classication of
security properties in mobile device authentication methods.
CCS Concepts: •Security and privacy→Mobile platform security; Trust frameworks; Authentication;
Additional Key Words and Phrases: mobile device authentication, adversarial model, survey
1 INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices such as smartphones carry an increasing variety of personal data. For instance, recent
proposals to include electronic identities (eID) into smartphones with the aim of replacing classical
photo identication documents like driver’s licenses or passports [123] as well as applications and
sensors to more accurately capture the wearer’s health status [118], audible interaction123 and even
emotional state [109, 167] highlight the breath of sensitive data.
Mobile devices therefore are becoming a critical component in terms of security and privacy not
only in the digital domain, but also for interactions in the physical world, with users unlocking their
smartphones for short (10-250 seconds) interactions about 50 times per day on average [79, 120].
In this article, we address user-to-device (U2D) authentication, i.e. users authenticating themselves
before being able to use certain functionality of a device [209, 265], as well as two other forms of
authentication, device-to-device (D2D) [49, 93, 182], and device-to-user (D2U) [88, 180].
U2D authentication can be performed by one or a combination of four factors4[83, 174]:
(1) something a user knows (passwords, PIN codes, graphical patterns, etc.)
(2) something a user possesses (hardware tokens, keys, etc.)
(3) something a user is (static biometric, e.g. ngerprint, face, iris, hand geometry, vein patterns)
(4) something a user does (dynamic biometric, e.g. gait, handwriting, speech)
Many authentication methods have been proposed for mobile devices, but not a single estab-
lished as canonical U2D authentication. Instead, approaches have their respective advantages
and disadvantages [65, 119]. Second factor authentication with something a user possesses often
1https://www.apple.com/ios/siri/
2https://developer.amazon.com/alexa
3https://assistant.google.com/
4For D2D and D2U authentication, various factors and physical channels have been proposed, but no systematic classication
has so far been accepted as common knowledge.
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demands D2D authentication through wireless communication. Secure D2D authentication is thus
a condition to using wireless devices as hardware token for U2D authentication. In this article, we:
• Survey security analysis in the state-of-the-art and derive their assumptions (which are
often not explicitly stated) about attackers of such authentication methods. These so-
called adversary models are a sub-set of threat models commonly applied to cryptographic
protocols.
• Show that existing security evaluations of these methods often lacks, with many proposals
using an insucient number of subjects or missing independent analysis by others.
• Propose a qualitative classication of adversaries to mobile device authentication that
enables a more systematic adversary modeling, and use this scheme in our review.
We design our classication scheme by studying the requirements for useful adversary models
at a meta level, with the aim of applying specic instances of these model classes to individual
authentication methods. Our intention is for this scheme to be used for future research, giving
authentication methods a concrete security level to aim for and to test against. Finally, this article is
also a call for action to improve the state of the art in security testing of mobile device authentication.
2 AUTHENTICATION ON MOBILE DEVICES
General threats for user authentication, which include brute-force, password guessing, installing
malware, and hardware-level exploits to bypass authentication, typically also apply to mobile
devices. Mobile device security, however, is inferior to security on desktop computers [50, 212]
while mobile devices add additional security threats [23] because of usability issues or limitations
due to smaller size, computational and storage capabilities [34, 124, 218].
2.1 Adversary models for user authentication
In a recent meta survey by Ferrag et al.[12] impactful surveys on mobile device authentication
are analysed ([7, 81, 104, 115, 146, 158, 187, 209, 212, 250, 265]). In total 26 dierent attacks were
described in these publications, 5 threat models and 4 categories of authentication. Complementing
this work on attacks and countermeasures, we focus on adversary models.
In the literature, formal models are employed to describe the security properties of a particular
protocol. For instance, the most famous adversary model for communication channels is the
Dolev-Yao model5, which assumes that communication partners trust their encrypted messages to
the adversary for delivery [78]. The adversary can use any information obtained from previous
messages to try to decrypt the information. In particular, she is not constrained by other prior
assumptions. The Dolev-Yao model is indistinguishable under chosen plaintext attacks, respectively
chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CPA/IND-CCA) for formal cryptographic protocol verication [24].
The existence of such accepted standards is crucial for the eld since it (1) helps to build trust in
security mechanisms, (2) generates a common ground on which approaches are comparable, and
(3) creates incentives to build stronger security schemes. It is also a necessary requirement for (4)
the generation of business models grounded on secure technology.
The literature on mobile device authentication has not yet converged on a common adversary
model and while the Dolev-Yao model has been applied for mobile device authentication [245,
273], this approach has shortcomings as it does not reect the specic nature of mobile device
authentication. For instance, mobile devices are typically resource constrained, authentication is
conducted in public spaces, potentially under video-surveillance, and the user interface is limited,
thus preventing some strong authentication mechanisms.
5Other types of formal denitions for authentication can be found, for instance, in static analysis or type theory [1, 33].
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Table 1. Previously proposed adversary models
Paper Security model Year
Ong et al. [206] Security levels based on key size, block size, and type of data 2003
Hager [112] Security levels conditioned on performance, energy and resource consumption 2004
Ksiezopolski et al. [152] Dierent applications require dierent security levels 2007
Gligor [105] Adversary model specically focused on Mobile Ad-hoc networks 2007
Sun et al. [257] Evaluation model based on quality of protection 2008
Damgård et al. [57] Trade-o between complexity and security in symmetric cryptography 2008
Ng et al. and Paise et al. [201, 207] Security model with adversarial classes based on computational complexity 2008
Burmester et al. [43] Mobile device security suers from limited resources 2009
Ahmed et al. [4] Security model building on iterative testing of security strength 2011
Boyd et al. [37] Denes security levels conditioned on key size, block size and type of data 2013
Do et al. [76] For forensic investigation, using adversary goals, assumptions and limitations 2015
Song et al. [249] Metric to measure the strength of pattern lock systems 2015
Do et al. [75] Dolev and Yao type of adversary model for Mobile covert data exltration 2015
Azfar et al. [18] Adapt an adversary model for forensic investigations on Mobile phones 2016
Miettinen et al. [190] Security levels conditioned on the entropy of the context source 2018
Do et al. [77] Adversary classied by assumptions, goals and capabilities 2019
Ferrag et al. [83] Survey on Threat models for mobile devices 2020
Hosseinzadeh et al. [125] Adversary model for RFID; grounded on Gong-Needham-Yahalom logic 2020
The landscape of mobile device authentication methods appears to be fragmented and methods
are hardly comparable to each other (see [37] for a large number of authentication protocols,
accompanied with reported attacks). This creates uncertainty on the security properties and on
the appropriateness of any mobile device authentication method. Specically, although recent
publications on device authentication bring forward a discussion on potential security threats or
attacker studies [46, 135, 150], a single universally accepted model is lacking.
Challenges to selecting appropriate security margins and cryptographic parameters are that (1)
real-world applications require dierent security levels [152] and that (2) the resources available on
mobile devices place limitations on the authentication method [43]. Attackers dier in capability
(ability, training, knowledge), e.g. typical user, developers or manufacturers, and in the eort
(storage, computational, monetary) they invest, e.g. individuals, organizations or nation states.
For this reason, models including attackers of various strength have been proposed [201, 207].
For instance, [4] identify a least-strong attacker by iteratively testing against decreasing security
strength. Ong et al. dene security levels based on key size, block size, and type of data [206].
Instead, Sun et al. suggest the quality of protection to measure the level of security [257], while
Hager considers instead performance, energy and resource consumption [112], and Damgard et al.
analyses the trade-o between complexity and security [57]. Recently, the analysis of context-based
authentication conditioned on the entropy of the context source was proposed [190].
Table 1 summarizes previously proposed adversary models. Due to the diversity of mobile
devices and applications, a single common adversary model might not be feasible. To be useful in
general practical application, a meta model, exploiting a set of models that account for dierent
usability requirements is needed to qualitatively assess the security level. Therefore, in section 4
we introduce a classication scheme for adversary models to support such qualitative comparison.
2.2 Limitations of traditional authentication schemes
Electronic devices are traditionally protected via alphanumerical passwords or PIN codes [98]. Due
to restrictions in the user interfaces of mobile devices, passwords generate a trade-o between
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Fig. 1. Visualisation of generic aack vectors in biometric systems (based on [217])
usability and security. A frequently employed alternative for authentication are graphical patterns.
However, such patterns are vulnerable to shoulder surng or smudge attacks [15, 27]. In shoulder
surng, the adversary either directly or through video [298] observes the authentication sequence
and reproduces it. In smudge attacks, the adversary visualizes smears on the touch interface left
behind as a consequence of user authentication. The frequent changing of authentication challenges
in order to counter these attacks again compromises usability [72].
Alternatively, biometrics, recognising individuals from behavior and biological characteristics6,
gained attention for authentication. This is attributed to biometric sensors included in smartphones,
such as ngerprint [138] (pore and ridge structure [254]), voice [47] (mel frequency cepstral coding,
today deep neural networks [143]), gait (heel-strike ratio [235] or cycle matching [199]), face
(features learned in deep neural networks [133]), keystroke dynamics (key-press latencies [194]),
or iris [288] (image intensity maps from Hough-transformed Daugman rubber sheet models [279]).
Since biometrics inherit noise, fuzzy pairing is used to account for dissimilarities in the key
sequences [139]. Sequences are mapped onto the key-space of an error correcting code (for instance,
BCH or Reed Salomon codes), where t bits can be corrected. This process also boosts the success
probability of an adversary. Assuming |c | bit long sequences of which t bits are corrected to result
in |c | − t bit long keys, the success probability of a single randomly drawn sequence is then only
t∑
i=0
( |c |
i
)
/2 |c | =
∑t
i=0
( |c |!
( |c |−i)!·i !
)
2 |c |
. (1)
However, biometrics can not be kept secret and they can not be revoked [84, 233, 234]. Consequently,
they can not withstand strong attackers under the assumption of targeted spoong.
Figure 1 shows attack vectors for biometric systems [217]: (1) biometric spoong [157, 192, 199,
242, 252, 296], (2) replay attacks [111, 228, 266], tampering with (3) feature extraction [166], (4)
biometric feature representation, (5) stored templates [101, 253], (6) modifying template data [111,
228], (7) corrupting the matcher, and (8) overriding the nal decision. Suggested countermeasures
include liveliness detection, supervised enrollment, and securing all stored biometric data [253].
2.3 Adversary models for device-to-device authentication
Device-to-device authentication is used to pair devices under mutual trust. The information relevant
for the pairing can be present at the devices, provided by human ineraction, or acquired from the
6International Organization for Standardization. ISO/IEC 2382-37:2012, Information technology – Vocabulary – Part 37:
Biometrics, 2012
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Fig. 2. Visualisation of generic aack vectors in D2D authentication systems (based on [39])
device’s software or hardware sensors. Also for D2D authentication, capabilities and resources of
the adversary are of key relevance for adversary models.
Figure 2 summarizes attack vectors for D2D authentication. In particular, devices acquire data
(stored, human interaction, or sensed), quantize it to bit strings after pre-processing, apply error
correction, and agree on a key. Attack vectors are (1) sensors (forcing the device owner to behave in
certain way); (2) bypassing acquisition through replay; (3) biased feature processing; Some protocols
employ communication before the actual key agreement [108, 235, 296] which might potentially
leak information (4); after error correction, which might be corrupted (5), the key agreement is
executed between both devices, thus enabling potential Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) (6), exploitation
of weak or false assumption-based key agreement (7) as well as impersonation attacks (8).
To prevent exhausting the key space, adversaries should be forced into a one-shot model [278].
For instance, Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE), implemented e.g. by Bluetooth 4.2
Secure Simple Pairing (SSP)7, IPSec, and ZRTP [142, 260, 301], ensures that the chances of a
successful attack depend solely on interactions in the protocol and not on oine computing
power [182, 231]. They thus provide sucient security margin even with short key sizes K. Most
PAKEs allow for multiple parallel protocol runs [278] and threat models that allow implicit error
correction choose a relatively high K = 24 to still have a negligible attacker’s success probability even
if only 16 out of 24 bits are compared correctly [80]. Similar margins have been chosen in Bluetooth
for PIN comparison with K = 20 and ZRTP for word comparison with K = 20. Modern PAKEs also
provide resilience to dictionary, replay, Unknown Key-Share, and Denning-Sacco attacks [272], as
well as towards mutual authentication, key control, known-key security, and forward secrecy.
Implicit pairing derives secure secrets from similar patterns, e.g. acceleration [89, 108, 117, 251],
audio [236], magnetometer [137], or RF features [178], from devices co-present in the same context.
2.4 Device-to-user authentication (D2U)
An adversary able to deceive a user into wrongly trusting the identity of a (malicious) device, can
harvest user credentials (biometric or knowledge-based) on a subsequent attempt to log in to the
device8. Device-to-user authentication attempts to address this issue by establishing a means of
authenticating the device to the user. One approach is to visually reveal secret information to estab-
lish trust, e.g. by displaying variations of secret images to assure authenticity [223, 224]. However,
7Because each Bluetooth pairing uses a new ephemeral passkey, SSP does not provide passkey secrecy [210, 230, 260].
8This is similar to the well-known credential phishing problem for websites with users mistaking malicious login forms for
genuine ones.
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such systems are prone to shoulder surng. Device-to-user authentication is intended to be used
frequently and must therefore mitigate usability drawbacks. Although mutual authentication is
well established in D2D authentication (e.g. IPsec [59]), it is rarely used for authentication involving
humans. One reason for this is that device-to-user authentication is bandwidth limited due to the
limited attention span and cognitive resources for the recognition of patterns by the user [180].
Initial approaches with vibration patterns have been analyzed [88] but seem impractical so far.
3 ATTACKS AND MODALITIES
For all authentication settings (U2D, D2D, D2U) we distinguish various attack types. An authenti-
cation system shall at least prevent accidental login from non-authorized users: evaluation against
blind guesses (knowledge-based authentication) or samples (biometric) [63, 82, 95, 107].
Any targeted attack will be more powerful [238], for instance, biometric spoong to exploit
weaknesses of specic biometric modalities [21, 274], such as using a picture of a target person in
an attempt to spoof face recognition.
An informed adversary may also attempt to attack the software implementation [215], or to exploit
security breaches in the operating system to leak condential information about the authentication
challenge [163], for instance, obtaining extraordinary privileges to install a keylogger.
In some cases, historical or other publicly available data can be used to elevate chances of a suc-
cessful attack. For instance, [20] exploits population statistics to launch an attack on a handwriting
biometrics system, while [237] leverage a typing-database to attack keystroke authentication.
Adversaries can also steal authentication samples to e.g. replay them [215], to train adversaries
to forge patterns [199, 266], or to distort the victim’s template and expose it to further attacks [286].
The victim sometimes enables attacks through careless actions that lower the eective security
(disabling authentication [95], inadvertently providing access to credentials [19]). Mobile systems
can counter this by e.g. careful choice of images [11] or geometric transformations [232].
Another threat is automated attacks against mobile authentication by robotic systems [238].
Finally, side channels are a common threat to mobile systems, such as smudge [15] and shoulder
surng attacks [94, 114]. Others are the use of on-device accelerometers to recover a PIN [16] or
infering credentials from channel state information (CSI)9 [164]. Countermeasures include input
methods that integrate haptic and audio feedback [27], or applying geometric image transforma-
tion [232]. Another countermeasure is to lower the number of authentication challenges presented
by introducing a limited access safe-mode to access non-critical functions without authentication,
while falling back to authentication for other functions [44].
4 CLASSIFYING ADVERSARY MODELS
Our classication of adversary models is related to ISO/IEC 62443 security levels in ISA99 [130]10:
SL1 “Protection against casual or coincidental violation”
SL2 “Protection against intentional violation using simple means”
SL3 “Protection against intentional violation using sophisticated means”
SL4 “Protection against intentional violation using sophisticated means with resources”
In our work, we classify adversaries along two dimensions: capabilities and eort (cf. gure 3).
9Changes in electromagnetic signals at a radio receiver caused by movement of a user or object reecting the signals are
visible in the CSI.
10Only a summary document of this standard is available online at the time of this writing, in the form of public slides by
Pierre Cobes; Available online at http://isa99.isa.org/Public/Meetings/Committee/201205-Gaithersburg/ISA-99-Security_
Levels_Proposal.pdf
6
Capabilities
C3
Capabilities of manufacturer, owner, operator
(in-depth knowledge; access to cryptographic keys,
instructions, or hardware ports (insider [181]).11
C2
Capabilities of a developer (knowledge about in-
ternal structure; no privileged access or possession
of cryptographic keys (Kerkho’s principle)).12
C1 Capabilities attributed to an average user (benignuser of the system, with no additional knowledge).
Eort
Resources (time, com-
putation, memory,
etc.) available to an
average individual
(dependent on culture,
country, time, etc.).
Resources available
to an organization
(capture-the-ag
teams, organized
crime, multinational
companies, etc.).
Resources available
to a nation state
(assumed to be able
to compel organiza-
tions or individuals
to assist).
E1 E2 E3
Fig. 3. Adversaries dier with respect to their capabilities and the eort they are prepared to invest
Capabilities in terms of sophistication of specic attacks dene an upper bound on the capability
of an adversary and which information and secrets they have access to. This is roughly comparable
to the denition of oracles in cryptographic protocol verication.
The eort in terms of time, computation, (volatile or non-volatile) memory, and other resources
is the upper bound on the amount of energy an adversary is prepared or capable to spend. This
limits the number of trials to attack an authentication method (e.g. the number of guesses in a
brute-force attack).
Both eort and capabilities dene qualitative (ordinal) rather than quantitative classes, and the
specic ranges will, while distinct, vary with time and context.
Classifying attacks along these dimensions allow systematic comparison of authentication
methods with respect to adversary models. Practical experience shows an increasing number of
attacks with low sophistication (capabilities), but high computational resources (eort), such as
cloud-support or networks of compromised machines)13. A preliminary version of our distinction
between adversary classes has appeared in [199].
Our scheme assumes that all authentication methods can be broken by an adversary with
sucient capabilities and eort. However, the required level of capability and eort to do so diers
between authentication methods. We dene in gure 4 four classes of adversaries to provide a rst,
ordinal scale to compare the security eorts dierent authentication methods have been tested
against.
4.1 Zero eort aacks
It is common procedure to measure false positive and negative rates for biometric authentication,
and this is also adopted to evaluate authentication schemes such as graphical passwords [8, 221, 261].
Most quantitative evaluations use n subjects with ground truth and compute the confusion matrix
of authentication attempts against stored templates. Common measures such as accuracy, precision,
recall, true/false positive/negative rates, or F-measure are all based on this same principle [30, 41].
We refer to this a zero eort attack because no malicious adversary other than benign subjects
exists (adversaries with basic capabilities (C1), and small eort (E1)). Zero eort attacks represent
the risk of random success and include naïve (non-targeted) brute force attacks. Examples are
honest-but-curious oce colleagues, or a stranger who chances upon a misplaced device.
11Within the scope of this article, we do not distinguish between an original manufacturer of a system, the current owner,
and a technical operator, but assume the superset of all their capabilities. In terms of cryptographic protocol analysis, this
class is most similar to a collusion between all parties besides the actual target system of an attack.
12We explicitly do not distinguish between original developers and outsiders, as the internal structure can typically be
reversed engineered.
13In terms of network protocol adversaries, these are often called ‘script kiddies’ or ’bot operators’ for DDoS cases.
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Fig. 4. Summary of adversary classes
4.2 Minimal eort aacks
A minimal eort attack is targeted, e.g. mimicing gait, but not with particular sophistication. This
adversary has no specic system knowledge (C1), but moderate eort (E1–E2). Minimal-eort
adversaries have the explicit intention of attacking an authentication method and a specic target.
Many published approaches used minimal eort attacks in their analysis, typically with students
or colleagues from the same research group, with low eort and low to average sophistication.
4.3 Advanced eort aacks
Advanced eort attacks show higher sophistication (C1-C2), e.g. professional actors trained in
imitating body motions, and signicant eort (E1-E3). We explicitly exclude the combination of
(insider) advanced developer-level sophistication with nation-state eort (E3,C2).
4.4 Guaranteed success aacks
A guaranteed success attack succeeds in breaking the security of an authentication method. It
allows for any system to describe which capabilities or eort is required for a successful attack.
Authors of device authentication methods are advised to include this adversary class to dene
the minimum adversary expected to break the system. An adversary in this class may possess all
capability (C2-C3) and eort (E1-E3). Note that low-eort guaranteed success attacks are possible,
for instance through access to cryptographic credentials (E1,C3).
5 LITERATURE SURVEY: ADVERSARY MODELS FOR MOBILE AUTHENTICATION
We discuss proposals for mobile authentication and adversary models used, and group the literature
according to the adversary class utilized to allow a domain-specic discussion of adversary models.
A summary of the publications covered is given in Tables 6 to 9. We recommend to use the survey
as a reference and refer the informed reader to the overview in gure 5 to quickly navigate to the
section of her interest. In addition, attack schemes are collected in tables 2, 3, and 4.
5.1 Biometric user-to-device authentication (bU2D)
A large body of work has exploited biometric stimuli for mobile authentication [188]. Measures cover
e.g. spoken audio, keystrokes, face biometrics, gaze, application usage, iris, gait, or ngerprint [131].
Most work in this domain show the general feasibility of a working principle (E1,C1; zero eort),
by using a small number of subjects distinguished by the modality, but no threat model, attack
scenario, or analysis of password space. Table 2 summarizes attacks on biometric authentication.
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5.1 Biometric user-to-device authentication 8 5.2.3 Gaze-based 13
5.1.1 Speech and audio 8 5.2.4 Audio-based 13
5.1.2 Keystroke and touch dynamics 9 5.2.5 Acceleration-based 13
5.1.3 Face 9 Head-movements 13
5.1.4 Iris 10 Acceleration-gestures 13
5.1.5 Application usage patterns 10 5.3 Device-to-device authentication 14
5.1.6 Gait 10 5.3.1 Acceleration-based 14
5.1.7 Fingerprint 11 D2U authentication 15
5.1.8 Body impedance 11 D2D authentication 14
5.2 Usably secure user-to-device authentication 11 5.3.2 Audio 15
5.2.1 Image 11 5.3.3 Token-based 15
Recognition-based 11 5.3.4 Electromagnetic signals (RF) 15
Recall-based 12 5.4 Device-to-user authentication 15
5.2.2 Multi-touch 13 5.5 Discussion on applied adversary classes 16
Fig. 5. Overview and structure of the literature survey
5.1.1 Speech and audio. A number of zero eort attacks has been considered for biometric
systems using speech and audio. For instance, in speakersense [172], during a voice phone call a
person is identied. The system was tested with 17 subjects, achieving over 95% of accuracy.
However, an adversary actively trying to break the system has not been considered (E1,C1; zero
eort). For instance, already a minimal eort attack using voice impersonation (replay) might trick
the system [47]. In [47] a protection against such attack is proposed by exploring the magnetic eld
emitted from loudspeakers to distinguish between playback and live voice (E1,C2; minimal eort).
Again, an informed advanced adversary, not using magnetics based loudspeakers with access to
respecive resources (advanced microphones) could easily circumvent this protection.
Another example for a system tested only with respect to minimal eort attacks is [300]. The
authors utilize the audio system of the phone as a doppler radar to obtain further evidence on
speaker identity. The authors launched mimicry attacks (adversary with access to video recording
and practice), but did not consider advanced (e.g. developer) sophistication.
An example of a comprehensive security discussion in this domain is the usable two-factor
authentication based on proximity measured from ambient sound is [141]. Starting from false
acceptance and false rejection rates (zero eort), advanced eort attacks are considered (similar
environment, same media) and the analysis further distinguishes remote from co-located attacks,
which then includes denite success attacks (E3,C3; guaranteed success).
5.1.2 Keystroke and touch dynamics. An overview on the use of keystroke-dynamics for mobile
devices is provided in [265]. A number of studies consider zero eort attacks only, such as [51], to
authenticate phone users via keystroke analysis of their PIN input [51]. Authors report equal error
rates (E1,C1; zero eort) but ignore active adversaries with access to advanced resources, such as
spoong key-press latencies can be spoofed with a generative keystroke dynamics model [194] via
trained replay attacks [215] or utilizing audio [266] or video [298].
Examples for studies considering minimal eort adversaries targeting specic subjects are [32,
128] or [63] to authenticate from dynamics of using pattern-unlock (E1,C1; minimal eort). However,
all these approaches omit investigation on protocol weaknesses or potential bias in the keystroke
dynamics patterns due to statistical distributions over a larger set of users [237].
5.1.3 Face. Face features for authentication are adapted also in commercial hardware14 [73, 229].
An example for a zero eort study is [148] who test their approach using face, teeth (stereo cameras)
and voice on a database with 50 subjects to report EER, FAR and FRR (E1,C1; zero eort), but
ignoring targeted attacks using advanced resources such as replay or database attacks.
14e.g. Apple FaceID: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208108 (An exact adversary model is not publicly documented)
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Table 2. Aacks on mobile biometric authentication systems
Paper Modality Attack scheme Year
Gafurov [102] Gait Impersonation 2006
Stang [252] Gait Continuous visual feedback impostors 2007
Gafurov [101] Gait Spoof/various attacks 2007
Ruiz et al. [228] Iris fake images 2008
Derawi et al. [71] Gait Active impostor 2010
Mjaland et al. [192] Gait Active long-term trained impostors 2010
Rahman et al. [215] Keystrokes snoop-forge-replay attack 2013
Tey et al. [266] Keystrokes Imitation through Mimesis technique 2013
Karapanos et al. [141] Audio Advanced co-located attackers 2015
Kumar et al. [157] Gait Treadmill attack 2015
Liu et al. [169] Keystrokes Snooping Keystrokes with mm-Audio 2015
Monaco et al. [194] Keystrokes Spoof keypress latencies 2015
Gupta et al. [111] Iris Attacks: Masquerade, Replay, Database 2016
Xu et al. [296] Gait Passive/active impostor (imitation), MitM 2016
Zhant et al. [300] Speech Mimicry 2017
Abdelrahman et al. [2] Keystrokes Thermal attacks on mobile user authentication 2017
Muaaz et al. [199] Gait Active impostor (imitation) 2017
Trippel et al. [160] Gait Poisoning acoustic injection attack 2017
Khan et al. [145] Keystroke Real-time mimicry attack guidance system 2018
Tolosana et al. [271] Signature Analysis of dierent spoong (presentation) attacks 2019
Marcel et al. [175] Biometrics Handbook of biometric anti-spoong 2019
Vyas et al. [283] bio-sensors Attack types on body area networks using bio sensors 2020
Tiefenau et al. [268] Biometrics Attacks bypassing authentication on mobile devices 2020
Neal et al. [200] Behaviour Spoong (presentation) attacks on various biometrics 2020
Jia et al. [134] Face Evaluation of 30 face spoong attacks 2020
Hagestedt et al. [113] Eye Attacks on Classiers for Eye-based User Modelling 2020
Examples for minimal eort studies are [73, 87] and also [56], who consider to break face-based
continuous authentication of 24 subjects by an impostor with no specic system insight (E1,C1;
minimal eort). These studies were not tested against advanced attacks, such as impersonation or
dodging via image manipulation [242] or using images from online social networks [166].
5.1.4 Iris. Iris recognition on mobile phones is constrained by the limited resources of the
phone and have been respected in the zero eort studdy in [147]. Without an adversary study,
only successful instrumentation has been veried (E1,C1; zero eort). A number of advanced eort
attacks against iris verication comprise fake images [228], masquerading (dilation and contact
lenses), database and template hacking attacks [111].
5.1.5 Application usage paerns. Application usage patterns constitute another biometric for
mobile device authentication, tested, for instance, in a zero eort study in [282] with 50 subjects,
but no attack study (E1, C1, zero eort), such as monitoring application usage via other apps on
the phone [247].
5.1.6 Gait. Despite studies suggesting gait as biometric feature [70, 99, 131, 226], studies inves-
tigating security features and entropy of gait are lacking such as impact of natural gait changes
over time by clothing, footwear, walking surface, walking speed and emotion [35, 204, 248].
Early studies on gait-based mobile authentication (shoe-mounted [22, 126, 195]; waist-mounted [5,
45, 71, 121, 122, 196, 225]; hand, breast pocket, hip pocket [280]) used zero eort adversaries, mainly
investigating feasibility (E1,C1; zero eort) and did not consider attacks .
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An example for minimal eort studies on gait-authentication are [100, 102], which consider
from pairs of 22 subjects the robustness of gait-authentication against impersonation attacks
(E1,C1; minimal eort). In an advanced eort study in [199], professional actors were instead
employed to mimic the gait of 15 subjects with close physical properties (E2,C2; advanced eort).
Other advanced eort study comprise control of the speed, step-length, thigh lift, hip movement
and width of steps [157] (E2,C2; advanced eort), intensively training individuals over multiple
days [192] (E2,C2; advanced eort) or exploiting a 100+ subject database of gait sequences [100, 101]
(E1,C2; advanced eort). In addition, the high accuracy of video-based gait recognition systems
also empowers an adversary to generate a database of gait information on multiple subjects
unnoticed [234].
5.1.7 Fingerprint. Biometric authentication using ngerprints is frequently installed in mobile
systems [274]. Typical attack vectors are (1) and (2) in Figure 4, since ngerprint impressions are
easily left on surfaces touched [233]. Attacks on Fingerprint-based systems are discussed in [138].
An advanced eort study providing countermeasures against such attacks, presents a system
combining biometrics, possession, and continuity features for progressive authentication (switching
between dierent security levels conditioned on the condence in the authentication) [222]. The
study comprised 26 attack attempts using 3 attack scenarios in which the attacker had system
knowledge and tried to avoid detection via video and audio sensors (E1,C2; advanced eort).
5.1.8 Body impedance. Rasmussen et al. propose a pulse-based biometric for two-factor or
continuous authentication. In their approach, a metal keyboard sends small electric current through
the user’s body of which the frequency response is used for authentication [177]. The study
investigates usability and disucss the theoretical password space (E1,C1; minimal eort) but lacks
a targeted attack study and an investigation on the uniqueness of body impedance in a larger
population.
5.2 Usably secure user-to-device authentication (uU2D)
Similar to biometrics, some usably secure authentication schemes are conditioned on specic
patterns presented for authentication. Attacks on these authentication schems, as summarized
in table 3, are either related to traditional attacks on authentication systems, or tailored to the
respective modality, such as shoulde-surng, or imitation attacks.
5.2.1 Image. Image-based authentication has an advantage [259, 290] over password or PIN-
based authentication due to improved usability [291], and since it is easier to recognize or recall an
image than a text [61, 72]. On the other hand, memorability and security strength of image-based
recognition in comparison to PIN and password based solutions when multiple (10-20) of such
passwords need to be remembered, has not been considered in the literature. Davis, et al. [60]
further found that (1) user password selection is biased by race and gender [38], thus lowering
password entropy, (2) the need for several rounds to provide a reasonably large password space
impairs usability, and (3) recognition-based systems are vulnerable to replay attacks [15, 264]. It is a
research challenge to exploit memorability to improve freshness of authentication challenges [202].
Recognition-based. systems condition authenticatoin on the selection of a specic image or groups
of images in a partiular order. A commercial example is Passfaces15 which uses images from faces
for authentication. Zero-eort studies proposing implementations of this approach with no security
investigation, are, for instance [6, 61, 261] (E1,C1; zero eort).
15www.realuser.com
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Table 3. Aacks and security analysis of user-to-device authentication systems
Paper Modality Attack scheme Year
Dhamila et al. [72] Image Brute force, observer, intersection attacks 2000
Thorpe et al. [267] Image Dictionary attack 2004
Davis et al. [60] Image Password distribution 2004
Ku et al. [154] Image Dictionary, Replay, Compromise password le, DoS, predictable n, insider 2005
Dirik et al. [74] Image Dictionary attack 2007
Hayashi et al. [116] Image Brute force, educated guess, observer, intersection 2008
Brosto et al. [38] Image Human bias in password choice 2010
Sun et al. [256] Multi-touch Shoulder-surng (Video observation and disclosure of exact password) 2014
Yue et al. [298] Touch Technical challenges of blind recognition of touched keys from video 2014
Huhta et al. [127] Acceleration Attack on the ZEBRA system [176], discuss improvements 2015
Li et al. [165] Acceleration Imitation of head movement 2016
Nguyen et al. [202] Image recall Shoulder surng 2016
Cha et al. [46] Pattern Optimal conditions for smudge attacks, protection, mitigation strategies 2017
Zhang et al. [299] Voice Dolphin attack: Inaudible voice commands 2017
Kraus et al. [150] Emoji recall Shoulder surng 2017
Chen et al. [47] Audio/Magnetom. Machine-based voice impersonation 2017
Miettinen et al. [190] Audio Impersonation, Man-in-the-Middle 2018
Prange et al. [214] various Threats and design aws of smart home environments 2019
Prange et al. [213] various Model of security incidents with personal items in public; survey and stories 2019
Shin et al. [243] pattern Attacks on android pattern lock systems 2020
Alqahtani et al. [9] image Attacks on machine learning for image-based capcha 2020
Bhana et al. [26] Various Usability and security comparison of authentication schemes 2020
Vyas et al. [283] Various Attack prevention schemes for body area networks 2020
A minimal eort study was presented in [72], in which the authors show that failed logins raised
to 30-35% for PIN and password based authentication, while it dropped only to 10% and 5% for
artwork and photo images. Several attacks are discussed (brute-force, observer, intersection), while
other attacks, e.g. on the image database or on the system are disregarded (E1,C1; minimal eort).
Another example for a minimal eort study is [150] (replace numerical PIN-pads with emojis),
which studied memorability and robustness against shoulder surng (E1,C1; minimal eort) but
did not consider any strong adversaries.
Recall-based. graphical password schemes require that a pattern is recalled, e.g. drawing a shape
on [132]. Since the precision required to establish a suciently large password space is high, cued
recall schemes provide cues that help to achieve sucient precision [29, 31], such as images to
guide the input or distorted and blurred images [116].
Example zero eort studies are [68] (pure recall) or [8, 211] (cued recall), which focus on usability
and the risk of observation attacks (E1,C1; zero eort), but lack an attack study or security analysis.
A minimal eort study is [149] which calculates the size of the password space and remarks
that chosen passwords are clustered [149] (only 10−8 of the space is used 25% of the time) (E1,C2;
minimal eort). Other attack vectors, such as shoulder surng or smudge attacks are not exploited.
In their adavanced eort study, Ku et al. [154] study a variation of this schemefor its reparabil-
ity [129], resistance against dictionary attacks, replay attacks, compromising the password le,
denial-of-service, predictable n attack and the insider attack [25, 153, 191, 267] (E2,C2; advanced
eort). Another example is [74], who analyze the PassPoints scheme (regions in an image constitute
an authentication challenge), originally presented in a zero eort study in [291]. The authors
present an evaluation approach for graphical password schemes, in which a password consists of a
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sequence of click points in an image. For the attack study, the probability of click points was consid-
ered as well as attention-related saliency features (luminosity contrast, color contrast, foreground)
in a study with more than 100 subjects. For the images used, the observed entropy was derived
from the observed FoA map (clicking probability to every grid square) (E2,C2; advanced eort).
Denite success cases and nation state adversaries with strong capabilities are not considered.
5.2.2 Multi-touch. has been proposed to increase the password space, reduce time to input a
password and to address security risks through shoulder-surng and smudge attacks.
Usability issues are in the focus of the discussion while security threats appear as after-thoughts
(E1,C1; zero eort) [205, 221]. For instance, [17, 262, 263] propose nger-tapping for multi-touch
pin authentication and investigate only usability in their 30-user case study (E1,C1; zero eort).
In an advanced eort study on multi-touch input in [256], the authors recruited 30 volunteers
to test rotation-invariant multi-touch free-form passwords. 10 adversaries with access to video
recorded password inputs and exact password shapes attacked the system (E2,C1; advanced eort).
5.2.3 Gaze-based. password entry exploits the movement of the eye for password input [67].
In zero-eort usability studies in [67, 156, 289], the subjects had to focus on some location on the
screen or perform eye gestures (E1,C1; zero eort), whithout any attacker consideration.
A similar approach was investigated in a minimal eort study in [94], where a subject stares
for a certain period (the dwell time) at an area on the display to perform an action [287]. The
authors evaluated their approach in a user study with 18 subjects and achieved an error rate for
the password input of 96% (E1,C1; minimal eort), whithout conducting an attack study.
An advanced eort study has been prestented in [40] and authors investigated the security of
gaze-based graphical passwords using saliency masks by theoretical estimation of password space
and discussion of threat models (E2,C2; advanced eort).
An example of a medium eort and capability guaranteed success study is [62]. Password input
by 24 subjects was video-recorded so that attackers could break the system in a single try in 96% of
the cases while the method was robust against simple shoulder surng (E2,C2; guaranteed success).
5.2.4 Audio-based. A targeted but unsophisticated attack study (advanced eort) over audio-
based PIN input has been presented in [27]. Subjects have been instructed and conducted targeted
attacks after observing the login process of the target. However, attackers were articially limited
in their access to the recorded material (e.g. no audio, reduced quality) and time (E2,C2; advanced
eort). In particular, it was derived in [190] that time is critical in impersonation and Man-in-the-
Middle attacks and that otherwise the secure establishing of a shared secret is possible.
A guaranteed success study is presented by [141], who propose to use similarity in ambient
audio as a second factor to authentication. Weak and strong adversaries are considered up to
guaranteed success attacks where the adversary is physically located in the same audio context
(E3,C3; guaranteed success).
5.2.5 Acceleration-based. An example for a zero eort attack is [170], in which gesture-based
authentication from acceleration sequences was investigated for its usability with ve subjects
(E1,C1; zero eort), without considering an attack study.
A targeted but unsophisticated attack study (minimal eort) is for instance [165] (authentication
utilising head-movement patterns while listening to an audio pattern). The authors provided
videos of successful authentication attempts to the non-trained amateur attackers to imitate the
authentication movements (E2,C1; advanced eort).
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Table 4. Aacks and security analysis of device-to-device authentication systems
Paper Modality Attack scheme Year
Mayrhofer [179] Arbitrary Man-in-the-Middle, DoS 2007
Schurmann et al. [236] Audio Statistical properties (keys); Brute force, DoS, MitM, Audio amplication attacks 2013
Truong et al. [273] Various Performance of sensor modalities wrt Dolev-Yao adversary (relay attacks) 2014
Anand et al. [13] Audio Extract vibration sequence from audio noise 2016
Kwong et al. [160] Acceleration Active dversary emitting acoustic interference at MEMS resonant frequency. 2017
Findling et al. [90] Shaking Protocol-specic attacks: observatory, cooperative, handshaking. 2017
Gong et at. [106] Audio Spoong, replay and zero eort attacks 2017
Schurmann et al. [234] Gait Brute-force, gait mimicry, video, adding a malicious device 2018
Bruesch et al. [39] Gait Gait-pairing: brute-force, mimicry, video, malicious device, protocol weakness 2019
Focardi et al. [92] QR Performance, size and security of cryptographic schemes with respect to usability 2019
Sha et al. [240] Spoong Attack on the downlink (half-duplex) in cellular communication 2020
An example of an attack study also covering guaranteed success is [14]. An in-air hand gesture
authentication system was evaluated through experiments including video-based attacks and
allowing to watch the video multiple times, rewind, or to play in slow motion (E2,C2).
5.3 Device-to-device authentication (D2D)
Device-to-device authentication, or simply pairing typically exploits similarity in context or prox-
imity to achieve seamless authentication [179]. Alternatively, device-to-device authentication can
also be realized following the principles of zero-interaction authentication [54], in which proximity
is exploited to verify identity without explicit input, but relying on contextual cues derived from
sensor measurements. In [273], security properties of these schemes is evaluated with respect
to dierent sensor modalities and with respect to a Dolev-Yao adversary. Table 4 depicts several
attacks on device-to-device authentication.
5.3.1 Acceleration-based. Examples for zero eort studies exploiting vibration are [161, 185, 186],
who exploit shared vibration sequences between physically connected smartphes or physical
tapping of devices onto each other. The prototypes have been validated for their basic functionality
but no attack or user study has been conducted (E1,C1; zero eort).
For this kind of key distribution which utilizes vibration as an out-of-band channel, Anand et
al. [13] attack vibration-based pairing schemes by overhearing the audio signature of the vibration
pattern (E2,C1; minimal eort).
In an advanced eort study, [275] authenticate mobile devices towards a remote server, where
the challenges are given by the duration of vibration and responses. A number of security issues is
discussed, follwed by a publicly available taxonomy and entropy analysis (E2,C2; advanced eort).
Alternatively, gait acceleration has been exploited for authentication between devices which are
carried by the same (walking) subject. Instantaneous and characteristic variations in the acceleration
and gait sequences, that can be extracted at dierent body positions constitute the features to a
pairing key [53, 162]. This problem has been considered in the zero eort studies [197, 198, 258],
which discuss general fasibility, usability such as averse aects of orientation dierences as well as
cross pocket gait-based authentication (left-to-right) but no adversary study (E1,C1; zero eort).
Advanced eort studies on gait-based D2D authentication are, for instance, [219, 295, 296], who
consider impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks, passive eavesdropping, impersonation,
entropy, randomness, key distribution analysis from a study conducted with 14 subjects analyze the
randomness of the resulting key (E1,C2; advanced eort). Examples for guaranteed sucssess studies
on gait-based D2D authentication are [39, 234], which concisely compare and evaluate several
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gait-based D2D authentication protocols, and consider brute-force attacks, gait mimicry, informed
attackers that exploit protocol weaknesses, as well as powerful adversaries with access to video or
possibility to attach malicious devices unnoticed on the persons body (E3,C2; guaranteed success).
A further attack on acceleration-based D2D authentication is to actively emit modulated acoustic
interference at the resonant frequency of materials in MEMS sensors to control or modify measured
acceleration, and thus inject changes to acceleration sequences [160].
Finally, minimal eort studies have been conducted on shaking-based acceleration-pairing [108,
171, 183, 184], where attacker-victim pairs have been built with the purpose of demonstrating the
robustness against active attacks (E1,C2; zero to minimal eort). Attacks on shaking-based pairing
protocols are, for instance, investigated in [90] (observatory, cooperative, handshaking).
5.3.2 Audio. An advanced eort audio-based D2D authentication was proposed in [106] in which
devices in proximity (round-trip audio signals) are automatically paired. Non-sophisticated replay
and spoong attacks were identied but no attack study conducted (E2,C2; advanced eort).
A guaranteed success study is [236], in which authentication is conditioned on ambient audio.
Statistical properties of the keys are discussed, as well as limitations of the approach and a number
of cases in various environments with dierent noise conditions is considered, also covering denite
success attack scenarios where the attacker establishes the same audio context at two distinct
places as well as silent cases that would cause the protocol to fail (E1,C2; guaranteed success). An
entropy estimation or adversaries with advanced technical support such as directional antennas
have been postponed to later work though.
5.3.3 Token-based. The authors in [203] propose a token-based system to verify user authenti-
cation at the time of touch interaction with the capacitive screen of the mobile device. A zero eort
usability study is conducted with 12 participants (E1,C1; zero eort). An example of a minimal eort
study is [136, 137] who exploiting magnetic interaction through a touch screen for token-based
implicit two-factor authentication. Technical feasibility and theoretical security in comparison to
PIN based login are discussed (E1,C2; minimal eort), an advanced and targeted attack study is
omitted.
The advanced eort study [90] proposes token-based mobile-device unlocking over a pre-
estaglished secure channel through conjoint shaking. Protocol-specic attacks, assuming ac-
celerated knowledge of the adversary were considered (E1,C2; advanced eort).
5.3.4 Electromagnetic signals (RF). Exploiting similarity in physical radio channel character-
istics, [178, 276] consider advanced eort attacks using only few subjects. They consider strong
adversaries that might control the radio channel and induce channel uctuation to bias correlation
for devices in proximity (E2,C2; advanced eort). The adversary has access to historical channel
information. Other advanced attack types, such as beam-tracing simulations are disregarded.
5.4 Device-to-user authentication
As described in [180], an adversary might try to exploit that a device or app is mistaken by the
user for another, trusted device or app. In this manner, credential information might be derived by
the adversary. This is especially critical when some devices in the usage chain of a mobile service
are not physically exposed to the user as, e.g. pointed out for 5G small cell installations in [277].
To protect against such cases, the author of [223, 224] proposes for a user interface (UI) to present
a known secret for authentication towards the user. This document merely sketches the idea. An
attack study or even a theoretical analysis of the attack surfaces has not been conducted (E1,C1;
zero eort)
15
Table 5. Selection of publicly available data sets in mobile authentication
Paper Modality Description Year
Gafurov et al. [101] Gait 760 gait sequences from 100 sujects 2007
Liu et al. [170] Acceleration > 4000 gesture samples, 8 subjects; over multiple weeks; 8 gesture patterns 2009
Fierrez et at. [85] Biometrics Speech, iris, face, signature, text, ngerprint, hand, keystroke from 400 subjects 2010
Findling et al. [73] Face 600 high quality, colored 2D stereo vision face images 2013
Wang et al. [284] Face Web faces database 2013
Galbally et al.[103] Passwords KoreLogic dataset of 75,000,000 unique passwords 2014
Truong et al. [273] co-presence 2303 Samples (co-/non-co-present: 1140/1163); Audio, Bluetooth, GPS, WiFi 2014
Shrestha et al. [245] co-presence Phone data (temp., gas, humidity, altitude, orient.); 207 samples; 21 locations 2014
Samangouei et al. [229] Face Database of 152 facial images 2015
Kim et al. [147] Iris 500 iris image sequences from 100 subjects 2016
Costa-Pazo et al. [55] Face 1190 video sequences of attack attempts to 40 clients 2016
Patel et al. [208] Face 9000 (1000 live/8000 spoof) face images 2016
Ramachandra et al. [216] Face Databases to benchmark presentation attack resilience 2017
Tolosana et al. [270] Handwriting e-BioSign signature and handwriting from 65 subjects 2017
Boulkenafet et al. [36] Face 4950 real access and presentation attack videos of 55 subjects 2017
Shrestha et al. [246] co-presence 100 audio samples from synchronized audio streams for non-co-present devices 2018
Tolosana et al. [269] handwriting e-BioDigit database (on-line handwritten digits) & benchmark results 2020
A device-to-user authentication approach exploiting vibration patterns has been proposed in [88].
The authors propose to dene specic vibration patterns specically for a device in order to allow
device-to-user authentication. The usability has been tested in a study with 12 subjects which
targeted on the acceptance of the system. Patterns have been recognized with 97% accuracy,
however, an attack scenario or adversaries with access to the device or audio in proximity (to
potentially reveal the pattern) have not been considered (C1,E1; zero eort).
5.5 Discussion on applied adversary classes
The proposed classication of adversary classes has proven useful to distinguish between various
approaches in the literature, as summarized in Tables 6 to 9. It is striking that more than half of
the literature considered falls into low security classes (zero eort or minimal eort). One reason
for this is that authors focus on the usability of their approach solely and disregard security. We
suggest that this lax habit need to be broken to develop better authentication approaches. An
insecure authentication approach might be convenient to use, but its usability is low. Security is
also an aspect of usability and must not be taken lightly. We should refrain from stressing mostly
convenience of usable security approaches.
This picture calls for a need of re-thinking and strengthening attacker models in mobile au-
thentication schemes, and for further research in this direction. Similarly, benchmark datasets are
needed in order to comprehensively compare mobile authentication approaches [117]. In Table 5,
we provide a selection of open datasets in mobile authentication.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Too many publications use weak adversary models, which is comparable to the early work on
cryptography, notably symmetric ciphers. In cryptography, nowadays, new cipher proposals are
only considered secure candidates16 after many other, typically more capable, cryptographers have
tried to break it.
16They will never be more than candidates. After all, there is typically no formal proof of security, only the absence of
specic attacks that mark a ‘secure’ cipher even to this day.
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Table 6. Summary Classification of Adversary Models – zero eort
Modality Refer. Performance # Type Remark Year
Gait [140] – E1 C1 44/25/71 bU2D Feasibility on 3 gait databases, No attack study 2003
Iris [147] Detection rate:99.4% E1 C1 100 bU2D Feasibility and success case. No security analysis 2016
Speech [220] Rejection rate: < 94.1% E1 C1 16+44 bU2D Feasibility study, playback attack resilience, no adversary 2019
Gait [122] Accuracy: 94.93% E1 C1 38 bU2D Android-based gait authentication. No attack study. 2013
Gait [121] FAR: 0%, FRR: 16.18% E1 C1 38 bU2D Naive brute-force success probability; no attack study. 2015
Gait [5] EER=FAR:6.4%,FRR:5.4% E1 C1 36 bU2D Feasibility of gait for authentication. No attack study. 2005
Gait [226] EER: 6.7% E1 C1 35 bU2D Feasibility study, no security discussion 2007
Gait [280] EER: 17.2/14.1/14.8% E1 C1 31 bU2D Gait-authentication from hand/hip-pocket/breast-pocket. 2006
Gait [225] EER:5.6%&21.1% E1 C1 21 bU2D Feasibility of gait for authentication. 2007
Audio [172] Accuracy:>80% E1 C1 15+17 bU2D Focus on success cases (speaker-distinction) 2011
Gait [22, 195] Accuracy:< 97% E1 C1 15 bU2D Feasibility of gait (shoe-mounted) for authentication. 2008
Gait [45] Accuracy:< 98% E1 C1 10 bU2D Demonstrate the feasibility of gait for authentication. 2012
Iris [173] FAR/FRR:< 6%/18% E1 C1 10 uU2D Feasibility study, general security discussion, no targeted attack2019
Gait [126] Accuracy: 96.133% E1 C1 9 bU2D Feasibility of gait (shoe-mounted) for authentication. 2007
Touch [69] accuracy: 100% E1 C1 – bU2D Evaluation details unclear, no adversary study 2019
Gait [99] – E1 C1 – bU2D Discuss security challenges, no attack study 2007
Keystroke [26] – E1 C1 112 uU2D Entropy and failures for login, no attack study 2020
Pattern [68] – E1 C1 86 uU2D shapes of strokes on touch sceen. Questionnaire: Usability 2007
Pattern [255] – E1 C1 81 uU2D Analytic metric proposed to classify password strength 2014
Image [61] Errors: 2%–10% E1 C1 66 uU2D Errors, usability, password completion time; no attack study. 2002
Image [150] Accuracy: 97% E1 C1 53 uU2D Human bias in password choice; shoulder surng robustness. 2017
Image [38] Accuracy: 97% E1 C1 53 uU2D Human bias in password choice; no security analysis. 2010
Gaze [94] Success rate: 96% E1 C1 45 uU2D Zero-eort random success study. No security analysis 2010
Keystroke [51] EER:12.8% E1 C1 32 uU2D 4-bit and 11-bit pin input; no attack study. 2007
Touch [203] Accuracy:12% E1 C1 12 uU2D Low energy tokens for interacition with capacitive devices 2016
Mult.touch[221] – E1 C1 30 uU2D Multi-touch image authentication. No attack study. 2013
Image [221] – E1 C1 30 uU2D Focus on usability and password space 2013
Gaze [67] – E1 C1 21 uU2D Usability of 3 eye-gaze methods; General security discussion. 2007
Image [291] – E1 C1 20 uU2D Improved usability of the PassPoints cued recall scheme. 2005
QR [58] Accuracy: 88% E1 C1 20 uU2D Validation and Usability study, no adversaries 2019
Gaze [156] Error rate: 4% E1 C1 18 uU2D Limited capability threat model (eyes not captured). 2007
Icons [292] Accuracy:90.35 E1 C1 15 uU2D Shoulder-surng robust; focus on usability; 2006
M.touch [17] Entropy: 15.6bits E1 C1 13 uU2D Multi-touch free-form passwords; theoretical password space 2012
M.touch [205] – E1 C1 10 uU2D Success cases and feasibility; no security analysis 2012
Shaking [171] – E1 C1 8 uU2D Attack shaking with random acceleration; no video; no entropy2014
M.touch [262, 263] – E1 C1 6 uU2D Success cases, usability (memorability & time); password space2013
Radio [52] TP/FP/FN:<95%/6%/51 E1 C1 3 uU2D De-authentication method; usability and positive cases 2017
Image [261] – E1 C1 – uU2D Self-captured images (conceptual study); no security analysis 2003
Image [8] – E1 C1 – uU2D Implicit authentication by clicking on objects in images. 2013
Image [6] – E1 C1 – uU2D Images for authentication. Concept; no security analysis 2004
Image [211] – E1 C1 – uU2D Image-supported password entry; no security analysis 2003
Image [290] Accuracy:>90% E1 C1 – uU2D Acceptance rate up to 5 months after training. 2004
Image [29] – E1 C1 – uU2D Image-based cued recall; password space and human bias. 2006
Gesture [110] – E1 C1 – uU2D Secure smartwatch authentication; No security study/analysis 2019
Gaze [289] Success rate: 83% E1 C1 – uU2D Eye gaze input by clustering gaze points. Only usability 2011
Acceler. [89] TPR/TNR:79%/86% E1 C1 29 D2D Non-targeted attacks (random success) 2014
Gait [235] – E1 C1 15 D2D Quantization for gait-based pairing. Statistical analysis keys 2017
Gesture [170] Accuracy: 98.6% E1 C1 5+5 D2D Authentication from acceleration (DTW matched); usability 2009
Acceler. [53] Accuracy:85% E1 C1 7 D2D Feasibility study (correlation); no adversaries 2011
Gait [258] Agreement rate:< 89% E1 C1 5 D2D Propose quantization method based on inter-pulse-interval 2017
Vibration [161] Success rate: <60% E1 C1 – D2D Common secret via vibration signatures; No security analysis 2018
Acceler. [251] – E1 C1 – D2D Collocation detection; User study unclear; no adversary 2015
Vibration [88] Success rate:97.5% E1 C1 12 D2U D2U authentication via vibration patterns; Usability study 2015
Image/text [223, 224] – E1 C1 – D2U D2U authentication via visual cues. 2010
We recommend to adopt this attitude for research on authentication methods and, in particular,
in the domain of mobile/ubiquitous/wearable/embedded devices. Studies often mix usability and
security concerns, which is commendable, because security is an important aspect of usability.
However, security is often considered as an after-thought and employing non-security experts as
participants can only provide an estimate for false negatives, but have little validity for the false
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Table 7. Summary Classification of Adversary Models – minimal eort
Modality Refer. Performance # Type Remark Year
Behavior [144] – E2 C1 40-158 bU2D Non-sophisticated attacks on multiple biometric systems 2014
Keystroke [285] EER: 12% E2 C1 104 bU2D Exploit adversarial noise; Non-targeted attacks 2019
Keystroke [10] EER: 9.9% E2 C1 100 bU2D Non-targeted comparison of collected keystroke entries 2019
Voice [300] EER:1%; Accuracy:99% E2 C1 21 bU2D Liveness detection system to protect against replay attacks. 2017
behavior [193] – E2 C1 20 bU2D Interactive biometric authentication; non-targeted attack 2019
Gait [252] EER: 26% E1 C2 13 bU2D Targeted attacks; video-recordings; physical characteristics 2007
Face [229] Accuracy:>0.72 E1 C1 152 bU2D Feasibility; database of 152 images; No security analysis 2015
Gait [71] EER: 20.1% E1 C1 51 bU2D Focus on success cases 2010
Gait [196] EER: 22.49% E1 C1 51 bU2D No attack cases considered 2013
Face [148] Error rates:<9% E1 C1 50 bU2D FAR & FRR; no dedicated security study 2010
Handwriting[269] Mean EER: 14% E1 C1 50 bU2D Non-targeted attack from database of samples 2020
Keystroke [63] Accuracy:<57% E1 C1 48 bU2D Intensive but untargeted (non-sophisticated) attacks 2012
Gait [122] Accuracy:94.93% E1 C1 38 bU2D No dedicated attack cases; FAR & FRR 2013
Gait [197] EER:18.965 E1 C1 35 bU2D EER for orientation-independent gait authentication. 2014
Gait/Face [86] EER: 11.4 & 5.4 E2 C1 35 bU2D Non-targeted blind matching of patterns between subjects. 2018
Gait [121] FAR:0; FRR:16.18% E1 C1 34 bU2D No dedicated attack cases; FAR & FRR 2015
Face [73] TP:0.9781; TN:0.9998 E1 C1 30 bU2D Focus on positive case 2013
Keystroke [128] EER:13% E1 C1 25 bU2D Limited capability attackers: Password provided; pattern not 2009
Face [56] TP:65%; FP:35% E1 C1 24 bU2D Victims rst interacted with device before handing to impostor2015
Gait [102] EER: 16% E1 C1 22 bU2D Active impostor; no matching person height, no actors 2006
PPG [241] acc: 96.31% E1 C1 12 bU2D Limited capability adversary; brute-force, shoulder surng 2019
Face [87] TP:93.89; TN:99.95 E1 C1 9 bU2D Positive cases 2013
Accelerat. [176] Accuracy:85% E1 C2 20 uU2D Bracelet: verify typing of legitimate user; weak attacks. 2014
Environm. [246] FNR:<14.5% E1 C2 2 uU2D Relay attacks; system knowledge assumed 2018
Audio [47] FAR/EER/FRR:0/0/<41% E1 C2 – uU2D Magnetic eld from loudspeakers; No tailored attacks. 2017
Magnet. [136, 137]Accuracy: 92% E1 C2 – uU2D Comparison: password space PIN-based login 2016
Image [132] – E1 C2 – uU2D ’Draw a Secret’ scheme; theoretical password space; human bias1999
Image [267] – E1 C2 – uU2D Dictionary attacks against graphical password schemes 2004
Image [116] – E1 C1 99 uU2D Usability; Brute force, educated guess, observer, intersection A.2008
App-use [282] – E1 C1 50 uU2D Study positive case with professionals 2016
Headmove [165] EER< 7%,FAR< 5% E2 C1 37 uU2D Reduced capability video analysis (no audio) 2016
Image [72] Success rate:90% E1 C1 20 uU2D Discuss possible attacks and countermeasures 2000
object [97] – E2 C1 15 uU2D HMD auth.; limited capab. attacks, brute force, shoulder surng2019
Impedance [177] Accuracy:>87% E1 C1 10 uU2D User study and theoretical consideration of the password space.2017
Drawing [239] – E1 C1 6 uU2D Threat model; no attacks; no Entropy; no statistical analysis 2014
Keystroke [32] Accuracy: 99% E1 C1 5 uU2D Random correlation attacks; no sophisticated or active attacker2013
Shaking [108] Success rate:< 95% E1 C1 – uU2D Entropy & security analysis; no trained, informed adversary 2012
Shaking [28] Success rate:80% E1 C1 – uU2D Entropy analysis of the generated keys 2007
Pattern [264] – E1 C1 20 uU2D Shoulder-surng robust; low capability, non-trained attack. 2006
Pin [227] – E1 C1 8 uU2D Shoulder-surng robust; complexity analysis; weak attack. 2004
Audio [13] – E2 C1 – D2D Vibration of devices in contact; extract key from vibration noise.2016
Shaking [183] FN:10.24%;FP:0 E1 C2 8/30/51D2D Competition among limited capability attackers 2007
Gait [198] FMR/FNMR:<0.09/0.47 E1 C1 25 D2D No attack cases; false non match rate / false match rate (FMR) 2015
Vibration [185, 186]FN=FP=EER:9.99% E1 C1 23 D2D Synchronized vibration through device-tapping. No attacks. 2014
Context [190] – E2 C1 – D2D Impersonation, MitM, no guaranteed success (same context) 2018
positives of an authentication system. To estimate these false positives, a class of signicantly
stronger attackers is required.
Authors should use realistic attacker models of adversaries who have a real motivation in breaking
the system and who are potentially either more skilled than the average user of the system and/or
willing to spend signicantly more eort than a legitimate user (i.e. false matches are allowed
much more eort than true matches). For a comprehensive discussion of a new model – and new
authentication papers should go this far in their own evaluation – authors should use additional
attacker models that will indeed break that authentication method.
The boundary of what security a system can achieve lies between advanced eort and guaranteed
success categories, i.e. how far it is capable of providing protection against targeted attacks. Good
authentication methods should dene this security level as precisely as possible.
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Table 8. Summary Classification of Adversary Models – advanced eort
Modality Refer. Performance # Type Remark Year
Gait [192] EER:6.2% E2 C2 50 bU2D Targeted attacks; trained non-professionals; EER: 6.2% 2010
Gait [157] FAR:70% (attack) E2 C2 18 bU2D Developer insight (features) & exploiting treadmill; FAR: 46.66%2015
Behavior [155] EER/FAR:< 5.9%/3.3% E2 C1 30 bU2D Public lock pattern, strong attacker with video 2019
Face [134] Classication Error rate E2 C1 55/40/40bU2D Presentation attacks, targeted from database 2020
Gait [101] EER:13% E1 C2 100 bU2D Mimicry, non-trained amateurs; non-matching characteristics 2007
Behavior [42] TAR: 99.35% E2 C1 85+6 bU2D Targeted attack; attacker strength unclear 2019
Fingerprint [293] Acc/FAR/FRR:< 99/2/3 E2 C1 90 bU2D Puppet attack resilience, limited capability (targeted) adversary2020
Biometric [222] Precision= Recall <93% E1 C2 20 bU2D System knowledge, audio/video support; 26 attempts; # unclear2012
Image [74] TPR:>0.79, TNR:>0.68 E2 C2 100 uU2D Automated attack; 70-80% password points correctly predicted 2007
Force [151] – E2 C1 50+10 uU2D Targeted attacks, video support 2017
Pattern [64] – E2 C2 32 uU2D Targeted attacks, video support, shoulder surng 2014
Pattern [66] Accuracy:44% E2 C2 24 uU2D Developer insight & video analysis (incl. playback) 2013
Gaze [96] TPR/FPR:81%/12% E2 C1 29 uU2D Targeted spoong attacks on free-form gaze-passwords 2019
Image [48] Success rate:>83% E2 C2 24 uU2D Cued Click Points; shoulder surng and dictionary attacks 2007
Gaze/gesture[3] – E2 C2 16 uU2D Unlimited video access. schoulder surng resistant 2019
Gaze [40] Success. attacks: < 25% E2 C2 4+12 uU2D Password space; threat models; Attackers with videos 2012
Pattern [46] FAR: 74% E2 C2 12 uU2D Smudge attacks: optimal conditions, protection, mitigation 2017
Audio [27] – E2 C2 12 uU2D Threat: audio-visual recording; Low detail security evaluation 2011
Radio [178, 276]FPR:<0.3 E2 C2 – uU2D Access to historical information; MitM; powerful adversary 2011
Image [154] – E2 C2 – uU2D dictionary, replay, pass compromise, DoS, predictable n, insider2005
Accel. [275] TPR/FPR: 0.7444/0.0978%E2 C2 – uU2D Security issues; public taxonomy; entropy 2016
Gaze [91] E2 C1 15+25 uU2D EOG-based, observation-attack resistant, targeted attacks 2019
Pattern [232] success rate:>70% E2 C1 20 uU2D Smudge protection; Limited capability attackers: 3 attempts 2014
Multi-touch [256] TPR:97.5%, FPR:2.3% E2 C1 30 uU2D Adversary with video & multi-touch password; FPR: 2.2% 2014
Image [202] – E1 C2 10 uU2D Always-fresh auth., Random & targeted attacks, non-trained, 2016
Environm. [245] FPR:16.25%, FNR:8.57% E1 C2 – uU2D Adversary with technical understanding of the system 2014
Multi-factor [174] – E1 C2 – uU2D Replay and MitM; nite automata as adversaries 2020
Gait [199] – E2 C2 35 D2D Trained, matched actors, 15 victims; EER: 13% 2017
Accelerat. [244] Prec/recall:>0.94,0.97 E2 C2 20 D2D Tap-based pairing via NFC 2016
Audio [106] FRR: 1-12%; FAR: <0.8% E2 C2 – D2D Co-presence via acoustic signals; spoong, replay 2017
Gait [296] Agreement rate:<73% E1 C2 20 D2D Impersonation, MitM; analyze randomness of keys 2016
Gait [295] Agreement rate:<73% E1 C2 20 D2D Impersonation, MitM; analyze randomness of keys 2017
Gait [219] – E1 C2 14 D2D Eavesdrop, impersonate, entropy, key randomness/distribution2017
Table 9. Summary Classification of Adversary Models – guaranteed success
Modality Refer. Performance # Type Remark Year
Audio [141] FAR=FRR=< 0.01 E3 C3 32 uU2D Incl. attakcer in same context (guaranteed success). 2015
Generic [294] – E3 C3 – uU2D Theoretical study: protocol security, various attacks 1998
Gaze [62] FAR:42% (attack) E2 C2 24 uU2D Shapes with gaze. video breaks system, shoulder surng not 2009
Pattern [159] – E2 C1 24 uU2D Smudge protection; image analysis to detect smudge patterns 2014
Magnet. [14] EER:96.6% E2 C2 10-15 uU2D sophisticated attackers, video analysis, (slow motion, rewind) 2014
Pattern [15] – E2 C1 – uU2D Smudge protection; Case study needs further detail 2010
Pattern [281] Error rate:9.5% E1 C2 24 uU2D Smudge protection; Single security expert attacker 2013
Gait [39] – E3 C3 15+482 D2D Brute-force, mimicry, video, malicious device, protocol aws 2019
Vibration [168] Accu/FPR:>95%/<3% E3 C3 15 D2D Implicit vibration an surface. Dierent attacker classes 2017
Audio, light [246] – E3 C3 – D2D Proximity detection; active adversaries; 538 audio samples 2018
Gait [234] – E3 C2 15+482 D2D Brute-force, mimicry, video, malicious device 2018
EMG [297] Bit mismatch rate:<0.4 E3 C2 10 D2D EMG signals for device pairing 2016
Various [273] FPR:< 27% E3 C2 – D2D Co-presence: WiFi, GPS, Bluetooth, audio; strong adversary 2014
Audio, light [189] – E2 C2 – D2D Context-based pairing; replay, same-context denite success 2014
Shaking [179] – E2 C2 – D2D MitM, DoS, incl. denite success (low noise channel) 2007
Shaking [90] EER:0.1293 E1 C2 29 D2D Observatory, cooperative, handshaking. No video or entropy 2017
Audio [236] – E1 C2 2 D2D Statistical key properties; attacks incl. guaranteed success 2013
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